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Electronic Health Records: Delivering the
Right Information to the Right Health Care
Providers at the Right Time
There is no health without management, and there is
no management without information.
Gonzalo Vecina Neto, Head,
Brazilian National Health Regulatory Agency

Introduction
In 1993 I wrote:
Communication and information management
consume as much as 40 percent of all inpatient
costs, yet errors still occur at an unacceptable
rate. The Institute of Medicine has suggested that
electronic medical records (EMRs) will help lower
health care costs, maintain quality of care, and
provide physicians with better information. (Tierney
et al. 1993, 379)
Nearly 20 years later I’m here to tell you how far we’ve come
toward implementing EHRs nationwide, and what we’ve learned
from our experience at the Regenstrief Institute in Indiana
University.
Most of us consider health care to be a service business, because
we think in terms of a patient who goes to the doctor to get some
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thing: advice, medication, devices, surgery, or physical therapy.
I’m going to argue that what patients really get, and health care
practitioners really provide, is information. Ninety-eight percent
of what we who practice medicine do is not the end result, the end
service, but the overall process of getting there.
I would also argue that medicine is more of an information
business than, say, banking. With banking, if I put $100 in the
bank, I know exactly how much it is, where it is, and what I can
do with it, which is not the case with medicine. If you come to
my hospital for a chest x-ray, the chest x-ray shows maybe there’s
an infiltrate, or some abnormal substance, in the lungs that could
be pneumonia, could be cancer, could be...and so you get a list of
things that it might be. If you have a fever and a cough with a little
bit of green in it, it’s probably pneumonia. I then have to figure
out, is it vital pneumonia or bacterial? If it’s bacterial, what kind of
bacterium is causing it? What antibiotics is it likely sensitive to?
And what antibiotics are available in my hospital that will likely be
effective in treating it? I could go through that reasoning process
appropriately and miss the fact that this pneumonia is due to the
obstruction of a bronchus due to lung cancer.
Health care providers dig through patient records, gathering
information based on a history, a physical exam, and laboratory
test results. Physicians record information in notes and sometimes
registries. They process that information, balance the risks
and the benefits, come up with the most likely and least likely
diagnoses, and then, based on all the various probabilities, make
a series of decisions (yes—do this, no—don’t do that). They
transmit information about those decisions as advice, orders,
communications, letters, and emails to other people. So health
care is a much more information-intensive and information-fuzzy
business than banking (see McDonald and Tierney 1986a, b).
And ultimately it’s the doctor’s responsibility to decide what to
do when the various kinds of information contradict each other.
2

William M. Tierney
My colleagues and I did a study of over 4,000 echocardiograms
(an ultrasound test to look at the inside of a patient’s heart for
structural problems) recorded at a large Veterans Administration
medical center to assess the level of agreement between the two
main diagnostic assessments of heart function that resulted from
each test (Subramanian et al. 2003). We found that the numeric,
or quantitative, measurements as performed by a sonography
technician, and the textual, or qualitative, interpretation as
provided by a cardiologist differed on the same echocardiograms a
third of the time.
My point is this: the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of
health care depends on our ability to manage information. This
information is messy and sometimes contradictory, and unless
you’re a fictional doctor on TV, like Marcus Welby, MD, and
have only one patient to care for, you have to manage information
electronically. It can’t be done effectively any other way.

The Regenstrief Institute
The Regenstrief Institute, Inc. is a non-profit research organization
with effective partnerships with the Indiana University School
of Medicine and the Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion
County, Indiana. It was founded in 1969 with the idea of applying
the techniques of biomedical science, computer science, and
industrial engineering to health care settings “to improve medical
care, to provide rational methods for marshaling resources, and
to foster the use of quantitative methods in medical decision and
policy making” (http://www.regenstrief.org/mission/history).
In 1972, long before the Internet even existed, the Regenstrief
Medical Records System (RMRS) was launched, with three goals
in mind:
(1) to eliminate the logistic problems of the paper
record by making clinical data immediately
3
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available to authorized users wherever they are—
no more unavailable or undecipherable clinical
records; (2) to reduce the work of clinical book
keeping required to manage patients—no more
missed diagnoses when laboratory evidence shouts
its existence, no more forgetting about required
preventive care; (3) to make the informational
‘gold’ in the medical record accessible to clinical,
epidemiologic, outcomes and management research.
(McDonald et al. 1999, 226)
In 1994, the Regenstrief Institute extended the RMRS to the
Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC), a city-wide clinical
informatics network in Indianapolis that has since grown to cover
more than 70 hospitals state-wide (Biondich and Grannis 2004;
Clement et al. 2005). Throughout its history, the Institute has been
the leading center for randomized controlled trials of medical
informatics interventions in the country. In this Policy Brief I
discuss some of our research, including examples of what we
learned works and doesn’t work in clinical settings.

Canopy Computing
The rain forest canopy is a seamless web through
which arboreal creatures efficiently move to
reach the edible fruits without any attention to the
individual trees. Individual health care computer
systems are rich with patient data, but rather than
a canopy linking all the trees in the forest, the data
‘fruit’ come from a diverse forest of individual
computer ‘trees’—laboratory systems, word
processing systems, pharmacy systems, and the
like. These different sources of patient information
are difficult or impossible to reach by individual
physicians, especially from their offices. The World
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Wide Web and other standardization technology
provide physicians and their institutions the tools
needed for seamless and secure access to their
patients’ data and to medical information, when and
where they need it. (McDonald et al. 1998, 1325)
What we call the health information canopy or canopy computing
is an electronic nervous system through which information flows,
connected to everything. I want to help you understand the density
and intensity of information in health care, and how clinical data
might be used—not only in caring for one patient at a time—
but also to improve the systems of care, especially the quality
effectiveness, efficiency, and outcomes of care.
Ideally, clinicians and their care institutions are connected by
this electronic network. If the information I need to manage my
patient is out there, I should be able to get what I want without
having to be in the facility where that information resides. People
practicing medicine in this canopy ought to expect that they can
get their hands on the data they need and that it will be available
for everyday decision making in practice. But in 2010, Clement
McDonald’s vivid rainforest metaphor from the 1990s has still not
been realized.
Ideal vs. Reality

To illustrate our lack of progress, I’m going to give you two
scenarios. First, imagine that a patient presents himself in an
optimum health care environment where information is available
at the right time, at the right place, to the right people, and can be
managed in the right way.
Scenario 1: The Ideal

An 81-year-old man arrives at the emergency department in an
ambulance. He’s awake but he’s confused. He has sustained a fall.
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He is unable to give a cogent history and nobody accompanied
him in the ambulance. This is not uncommon in an emergency
department (ED) setting. People just show up and you don’t know
anything about them. But in this scenario, the physician looks up
the medical history in a city-wide information system and finds:
A neurologist’s note says the patient has a history of multiple
system atrophy (MSA), which is a combination of dizziness
(his blood pressure drops when he stands up), problems with
balance (cerebellar dysfunction), and Parkinsonism. He had a
toxic reaction in the past to low-dose Sinemet, a drug that’s used
to treat Parkinson’s disease, which caused severe agitation and
hallucinations.
Primary care notes in the same record show that the patient
had a small increase in his cardiac enzymes during an earlier
hospitalization for pneumonia, so his primary care physician put
him on aspirin and a platelet inhibitor called clopidogrel, or Plavix.
This combination increases the risk of bleeding in the brain with
head trauma.
A social service note shows that the patient insisted on living
alone in his home after his wife died. He has four adult children
who live out of state and he’s receiving 24-hour live-in support
from non-medical personnel.
The record includes a physical therapy note that the patient has
made great progress in weight and balance training, but he falls
unless he uses his walker. Unfortunately, he has mild dementia and
impaired memory, so he often forgets to use his walker. Hence the
fall.
The city-wide information system shows he’s on a medication to
keep him from losing water, which works kind of the opposite of a
diuretic, and is used for people with MSA. But it tends to raise his
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blood pressure. He takes esomeprazole (Nexium) for acid reflux,
aspirin, a multi-vitamin, and Tylenol for pain.
He has a living will that says he doesn’t want to have any
extraordinary life-prolonging medical treatments.
A physical examination in the ED shows him to have severe
dizziness and his blood pressure drops when he stands up. His
neurological exam doesn’t point to anything in particular, although
he’s got a Parkinsonian tremor. He has ataxia—he staggers when
he walks. He’s got an enlarged prostate. He is awake and can talk,
but he has a mild expressive aphasia, that is, he has trouble getting
the words out.
His laboratory examination is completely normal except for a
mild or moderate increase in his creatinine, meaning his kidneys
don’t function quite right. And a head CT scan shows he had a
small bleed between the hemispheres of his brain (intrafalcial
hematoma) and he’s got severe atrophy of his brain, which happens
to people with dementia. The bleed has not compressed parts of the
brain so it should not be causing any neurological problems. The
neurosurgeon sees the patient in the emergency room and says, “I
want to admit him and watch him, just observe him for 24 hours.
I don’t think that there’s anything acute going on, but let’s watch
him.”
The ED physician calls the out-of-state daughter listed as next of
kin in the city-wide medical record and informs her of her father’s
condition and admission to the hospital. The ED physician also
collects additional data about the medical history and quality
of life, as well as the patient’s desire to avoid extraordinary and
invasive treatments. He then e-mails the neurologist and primary
care physicians to let them know the patient’s in the hospital and
why, and what’s being done.
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The ED physician calls the hospitalist to inform him that the
patient is being admitted to him and discusses the condition and the
plans. The hospitalist reviews the data, calls the daughter, confirms
the information collected by the ED physician, and discusses
plans. The hospitalist writes admitting orders using the Computer
Physician Order Entry (CPOE) system, which informs him of the
prior adverse reaction to Sinemet. The neurosurgeon follows up the
next day, repeats the examination and the CT scan, which are both
unchanged, and recommends discharge after 24 hours.
The hospitalist discusses discharge plans with the family, in-home
caregivers, physical therapists, and social services or e-mails the
plans to them, all of whom he can identify because they’re all
listed in the same city-wide record, even though they don’t all
work in the same hospital. The discharge note contains a summary
of what happened to the patient, what was done in the hospital,
and what the plans were at discharge. Follow-up appointments are
made electronically with the neurologist, primary care physician,
and physical therapist.
Remember that story because we’ll return to it.

Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC)
The Indiana Network for Patient Care (INPC) was launched in
1994 with funding from the National Institutes of Health and
the National Library of Medicine. Its charter five major hospital
systems include 15 different hospital facilities and more than 100
geographically distributed clinics and day surgery facilities in
Central Indiana (http://www.regenstrief.org/medinformatics/inpc).
Collectively these five systems admit about 170,000 patients, and
serve about 400,000 ED visits and 2.7 million clinic visits per
year. To date, more than 70 hospitals have joined INPC, which
required establishing more than 1400 separate interfaces with
these hospitals’ information systems. All INPC facilities deliver
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registration records, laboratory test reports, and selected other
records for hospital admissions and ED visits to a central INPC
server. The data are automatically standardized in format and
coding as they arrive at the server, and patients with multiple
medical records are linked. Each institution’s INPC record has
the same file structure and shares the same term directory that
contains the codes, names (and other attributes) for tests, drugs,
coded answers, and so on. There are more than 3 billion ‘structured
results,’ individual items for more than 11 million patients, and
this number doubles every four months. When a patient is seen in
any of the EDs operated by the member hospitals, and the patient
consents, all of the information about that one patient from all
INPC facilities can be presented as one virtual medical record.
In 2001-2002, to learn how much patients migrate throughout a
community, that is, obtain health care (and generate clinical data)
in more than one hospital system, the INPC examined the records
of nearly 500,000 patient visits to the EDs of hospitals in the
five charter health care systems within the network that provide
most of the acute medical care and found that of the patients who
had sought ED care in one hospital setting during that period, 60
percent had clinical records in another hospital system (Finnell et
al. 2003). Using data from the Centers for Disease Control they
extrapolated that “20.6 million ED visits [nationwide] would have
clinical information located in another, separate facility” (2003,
237).
Unfortunately, in most of the rest of the country we still don’t
have a health information canopy. Instead, we have freestanding,
unconnected, vertical silos of information. We try to connect the
silos by various means, such as a telephone call to ask for a fax of
somebody’s discharge summary from another hospital.
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Scenario 2: What Really Happened

Now I’m going to go back through the story I told you earlier, this
time telling not the idealized version, as if all the information were
available, but how it really happened in a large town in Florida.
An eighty-one year old man arrives in the emergency department.
That part doesn’t change. The man arrives with no information.
He’s never been to this hospital before. There are no records
available, no known next of kin, nobody to call. A physical
examination shows the same thing as before: the patient is dizzy,
orthostatic, ataxic, falls and can’t speak very well. The diagnostic
test results are the same—a bleed in the brain, abnormal renal
function, and so on. The neurosurgeon’s recommendation is the
same; the patient is hospitalized for observation. The hospitalist
discusses this information with the ED physician and writes
admitting orders on paper, which at some time later are transcribed
and acted upon. The patient’s in-home caregiver calls the daughter
to say that her father has been hospitalized. The daughter calls the
hospital and is told by the nurse who represents the hospital, “Your
father’s in intensive care, his condition is critical, but I can’t tell
you any more because of HIPAA.”
For those who don’t know, HIPAA refers to the Health Insurance
Portability and Affordability Act, which was enacted by Congress
in 1996. HIPAA was supposed to make information more portable
and to encourage the structured electronic transmission of health
care data. However, the law’s complicated privacy rules have
turned out to have exactly the opposite effect. Quality of care has
been sacrificed on the altar of confidentiality.
And that’s what happens in this case. No information is available
to the clinician, so the clinician doesn’t know, for example, about
the patient’s previous toxic reaction to Sinemet. The daughter
asks to speak to the physicians and the nurse representative says,
“You can’t talk to the doctors without permission from the patient,
10
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and the patient didn’t give any written permission.” The fact
that he can’t give permission because he was hospitalized due to
cognitive dysfunction doesn’t make any difference to the hospital
official. So the admitting order includes Sinemet for a Parkinsonian
tremor. He becomes very agitated and delirious, for which he is
given a sedative. The patient becomes over sedated, then vomits
and aspirates—inhaling the vomit into his lungs. The patient has
trouble breathing, experiences a prolonged period of hypoxia (low
oxygen in his blood), and is put on a ventilator. He lapses into
a coma. The next day, the CT scan results haven’t changed, and
the neurosurgeon repeats his exam and finds the same thing: no
evidence that the small intracranial bleed is causing any problems.
There are no other focal findings, and the neurosurgeon doesn’t
know why the patient is in a coma, except that it isn’t due to the
bleed in his head, so it must be something else—perhaps the
prolonged period of hypoxia.
The patient’s living will is not available. The patient’s oldest son
is finally contacted, on advice from the caregiver, and because he
didn’t know that there was a living will he says, “Do everything.”
The patient is successfully weaned from ventilation and has the
breathing tube pulled out. Unfortunately, the patient vomits and
aspirates again and the tube is re-inserted.
The patient’s condition doesn’t improve, so he is transferred to
a nursing home without any accompanying information. The
nursing home has no idea why the patient is there, but they think
it is because he has pneumonia and Parkinson’s disease. No
family members are notified by the hospital or the nursing home
that the patient has been transferred out of the hospital. There is
no communication between the nursing home physicians and the
family for a week despite frantic attempts by the family to contact
them. The patient has a respiratory arrest at the nursing home,
undergoes a full resuscitation effort which is unsuccessful, and
dies.
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The patient in this scenario was my father, and you can say in
very real terms that his death was caused by HIPAA and lack of
information flow between his health care providers.

The US Lags in Advanced EHR Capacity Among
Developed Countries
The Commonwealth Fund surveyed primary care physicians in
eleven highly developed countries and found that among doctors
who reported using ‘basic’ electronic medical records in their
practice, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway were at the
top (nearly 100% usage), while the United States and Canada
ranked at the bottom, with 46% and 37% respectively (Schoen et
al. 2009). Among those who reported using ‘advanced’ electronic
information functions (such as electronic medical records, and
electronic prescribing and ordering of tests) Australia and New
Zealand led, at 91% and 92% respectively, followed by the United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and eventually
the United States at 26%. Norway, France, and Canada were at the
bottom.
It isn’t because we physicians don’t have computers in our offices.
Nearly all physician practices in the US use computers, mostly
because the insurance companies demand it for billing. But fewer
than half of those practices use computers for electronic records
to support the delivery of care. The benefits of EHRs are not
immediately apparent to many doctors.
Some years ago, I went to a wedding where a friend introduced
me to the father of the bride. Striking up a conversation with him,
I asked, “What do you do?” He said “I’m a family physician. And
I want to tell you I’m really pissed off right now ’cause we are
installing this electronic medical record system in my office and
it’s driving us crazy. We had a really efficient office and now we’re
trying to put in these computers and it slows me down—I can’t
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do what I want to do, and it’s driving me crazy! So—what do you
do?” (I’m not making this up....)
I explained what I did, having spent a career creating, installing,
and studying EHRs. Then I described the Indiana Health
Information Exchange (IHIE) and the INPC. I described my
patient who was admitted with an infected elbow. By accessing
his city-wide record I found out he had been admitted to five other
hospitals in our city in the past 18 months with joints on the left
side of his body infected with fecal-oral organisms. This guy was
self-mutilating by injecting himself with stool. I would never have
known that if his other records weren’t available, even in another
system.
He replied, “If I knew what happened to my patients outside
of my office, then everything I’m going through to implement
the new health record system would be worth it—because my
biggest frustration is not knowing what’s happening to my patients
somewhere else.”

Local Health Information Infrastructure
When Clement McDonald foresaw health information networks
and canopy computing back in 1988, people didn’t ‘get it.’ People
understand this better now because of their experience surfing the
Internet. We’re moving to a single worldwide computer called
the web, one global computer, one global mind. Apple created
the model for this with the iPhone. Apple didn’t have to do it all
themselves. They took the approach that they would create the
platform and let somebody else write applications for it. Just
having the thing out there and having access to the data means
people can then write innovative applications that do something
with those data. We’ve gotten used to expecting this in every
context but health care. I can find out everything I want to know
about my favorite ballplayer by simply typing his name into
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Google®. I think we ought to expect the same type of response
in health care, too. That’s what the canopy should do: provide
the information I need for my patient regardless of where it was
generated or stored. The future of high quality affordable care
depends on such innovation.
What elements are required to build a working local health
information infrastructure (LHII)?
Uniform coding system. If you have a chest x-ray done in one
hospital, providers in other facilities need to know that it’s a chest
x-ray and what it showed, so you have to have a common code
for things. You could use words, but which ones? There are many
different ways of labeling things: chest x-ray, chest xray without a
dash, or maybe chest radiograph. In 1994 the Regenstrief Institute
developed LOINC (Logical Observation Identifiers Names and
Codes) as a universal standard for identifying medical laboratory
observations (http://loinc.org). It has since been expanded to
include more than 58,000 observation terms, and it has been
adopted by the federal government as a standard for the electronic
exchange of clinical health information.
Real time data flow. The data have to flow up and into the system
and down to the individual providers. To do that, you have to have
a standard message format. Think of the front of an envelope: you
can tell by the location and format of the information who the
letter is to, who it’s from, and when and where it was postmarked.
There’s a standard coding format called Health Level Seven
International, or HL-7 (http://www.hl7.org) that will take a long
string of data and turn it into something that’s meaningful to a
computer. HL7 is the most widely accepted standard format for
health information exchange.
Data repository. This can be a single database, collecting data
from all these hospitals and putting them in one database. Or you
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can keep them in separate databases where a querying program
can access this federation of databases and retrieve individual
patient data very rapidly to create what’s known as a virtual
record, which is how INPC operates. Every hospital has its own
database because, while hospitals are willing to share information,
they prefer to maintain their own records and dictate the rules
under which those records will be shared. Rarely in its 20+ year
history have there been breaches of security in INPC and no
major occasions when people’s data have been used for nefarious
purposes.
Interface engine. This provides access to the data once they’re
in the database. You enter the patient’s name or identifying
number, specify the data you want, and it displays on the screen.
The information may come from several different places, but you
see it combined on one screen as if it is from a single database.
The system has to be usable by both people and other computer
programs. My hospital may want to know how well we treat
diabetes, so we identify diabetics, look at their blood sugars done
by any number of different doctors, and see how effectively they’re
being managed. All of that can be done by extracting data from the
data exchange.
Most Data Are Already Electronic

There’s no longer a paper chart in our hospital. Integrated inpatient
and outpatient registration and scheduling systems, diagnoses
and admission, discharge, transfer (ADT) systems, lab systems,
pharmacy systems, radiology systems—being able to view an x-ray
anywhere—are all innovations that have come about in the last five
to seven years.
When that first became available. I had a young woman admitted
to me with chest pain. I looked up her x-ray on my office computer
before I went to see her—it hadn’t been read by the radiologist
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yet—and it showed the patient had a small airway that had
ruptured, causing a spontaneous pneumothorax, or collapsed lung.
I immediately transferred the patient to surgery, a chest tube was
inserted, and she left the hospital in a day or two. I could manage
her care from a distance within seconds because I knew where
this piece of information was, and could access it from a distance
without having to run around to find it.
Not All Important Data Are Electronic

But you need to know that there are some important things that we
providers do not record.
Past history, unless it happened within our network, is not
available.
Family history.
Symptoms. We might occasionally write them in notes, but don’t
record them in a way that they can be retrieved by a computer.
Quality of life assessments, either formal systems such as the
RAND Medical Outcomes Study 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF36), or what I call the SF-1, the “How you doin’?” question. We
don’t record that, but I think we’re going to have to in the future.
Mental health, for example, is way ahead of the rest of medicine
because they have standard instruments to assess and record
important symptomatic conditions like depression.
Vital signs, if they’re not done with an electronic cuff, are almost
never recorded in a place where they’re actually available.
Telephone communications, verbal orders, and prescriptions are
often simply written on pieces of paper.
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Selected outcomes, such as responses to medications. You may be
able to tell what the patient is taking, but you also want to know
how well they’ve responded to it in the past or what they have
taken that they have not responded to, and the patient may not be
able to tell you.
True health care costs. We know charges really well. We don’t
know what drugs and tests, etc. really cost patients, providers, and
health care facilities. And charges are a myth, they’re whatever
people are willing to pay...or not. They have little relationship to
what we or our insurance companies actually pay for our care.
Barriers to Using Current Electronic Data

Lack of connectivity for transporting data. If somebody goes
outside of your system, outside of your network, how do you
get the data to somebody else? If you’re in one of the Veterans
Administration’s 1,719 medical centers or other health care
facilities, they all have the same electronic record system. Kaiser
Permanente is somewhat the same way. Not many other places can
do that, and it’s a problem because that’s what we’re aiming for
with the interoperability that’s demanded by the new health care
act. Outside facilities may be connected to the Internet, but they
don’t have efficient and effective ways of transmitting data, and
they often use different data models and coding systems.
Worries about data security and HIPAA. We’ve held focus
groups in Indianapolis with poor inner-city patients to explore their
thoughts about sharing data between their health care providers
(doctors and pharmacies and the like), and the most common
answer we got was “You don’t do that already? Why not?” They
think providers ought to be sharing because most patients know
they’ll get better care if the information follows them when they go
to get care in different places.
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Competition between providers. This presents additional barriers.
Doctors may say “I don’t want to give you data about my patient
because you may steal my patient.” Controlling the patient’s
information can control where the patient gets care.
Inertia. This is also a problem. Many physicians don’t want to
do anything new. They’re often incredibly busy and comfortable
with the status quo, and change takes time. That’s the most
expensive thing in changing health care systems—not technology,
not personnel, but the time it takes to re-engineer and redevelop
systems of care.
The general disconnect between cost and savings. Many
physicians think, “If I put an electronic medical record system in
my office practice, it saves money for the insurance company and
for the patient and for the employer, but it doesn’t save me any
money, so why should I pay for it? ”
Overcoming Those Barriers

Today, computers and e-literacy are pervasive. Nearly everybody
uses a computer and understands what computers are capable of
doing, so we’ve got at least the trunks of the canopy. During a
recent study of a system for capturing adverse drug events that we
conducted in rural research networks in Connecticut, Texas, and
Oregon, as well as urban practices in Los Angeles, we developed
a completely separate system that required only standalone
computers without using the Internet (Hickner et al. 2010). We
even included another system that was on paper, but the standalone
computer and paper versions were rarely used because everyone
had access to the Internet in their offices.
In his 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush
announced creation of the Office of the National Coordinator for
Health and Information Technology (ONCHIT) and committed the
United States to going to electronic health records in the next 10 to
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15 years. In 2009 the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act was enacted as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Pub. L. 111-5, Subtitle
A, Section 4104(a)). It promotes the adoption and “meaningful
use” of health information technology in the US. It provides
payment incentives to physicians who implement an EHR system
under either Medicare or Medicaid between 2011 and 2016. Today,
if you can show that you’re capturing data in your practice or your
hospital and you have the ability to share it with other people, and
if you’re using inter-operable standards of messaging and coding,
then you’re going to get $40,000 per physician. So now we’ve
begun aligning costs and benefits.
By 2013, you have to show that you can do advanced care and
decision supports with your system. And by 2015, you have to
start showing you’ve improved outcomes, and you’re going to get
penalized, meaning getting lower payments from Medicare, if you
don’t use electronic medical records in a “meaningful” way.
We are beginning to see very creative uses of health information
technology to solve some sticky problems in US health care. For
example, some hospitals that can’t afford 24/7 physician coverage
in their ICUs rely on clinicians in India to monitor patients in their
Electronic Intensive Care Units (EICUs) late at night, looking at
the data and acting on it when needed. While some doctors may
view this technology as a threat to the traditional doctor-patient
relationship, it may be better than having nobody watching and
capable of intervening. Besides, as Howard Bleich, one of the other
pioneers of medical informatics, noted in 1985, “Any doctor who
can be replaced by a computer deserves to be.”

Computer-based Physician Order Entry
One of the innovations required by the HITECH Act is Computerbased Physician Order Entry (CPOE). The Institute of Medicine
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(2006) recommends CPOE be used universally to write orders to
avoid adverse drug events (ADEs). The National Quality Forum
(NQF) lists CPOE as one of its safe practices (NQF 2008). And
CPOE is one of the benchmarks that the Leapfrog Group (2000)
recommends for universal adoption by hospitals to reduce serious
medication errors and thereby promote patient safety.
This ought to help us improve both the quality and the safety of
health care, and lower its costs. How might it help?
Providing alerts about drug interactions, drug diagnosis
interactions, warnings, and duplicate therapy—identifying
instances where a patient’s already received this drug from
somebody else.
Transmitting data electronically, and quickly, to the right people.
Providing basic clinical decision support, such as limiting tests
to ones that actually exist in the institution you’re working in or
ordering only those drugs that you actually have in your formulary
or which the patient’s insurance allows without special approvals.
Aiding in dosing of drugs based on the patient’s weight and
kidney function. Some of us have trouble doing those calculations
in our heads. This can also prevent doctors from ordering a drug in
a toxic range; you can’t order something that’s ten times the dose,
or something in milligrams when should be in micrograms, like
thyroid medication.
Checking on allergies. If someone came into the ED ten years
ago with an allergy to a medication, that information ought to be
in the system forever so when that person comes into any system
connected to that ED that information should be displayed to a
doctor trying to order that medication.

20

William M. Tierney
Then there are advanced levels of support that you can build into
CPOE systems, such as:
Identifying patients who are at a higher risk for a condition,
such as heart disease, who can be targeted for specific
interventions, such as behavior modification programs.
Suggesting ‘corollary orders’ such as a follow-up test to a change
in medication.
Pointing out appropriate preventive care actions that are not
being followed.
Encouraging adherence to evidence-based practice guidelines,
such as tighter than usual blood pressure control in patients with
diabetes .

Does CPOE Work?
Interestingly, there’s only been one randomized controlled trial
of the use of CPOE in hospitals (Tierney et al. 1993). It’s the
only one that exists for two reasons. First, such studies are hard
to do because one has to set up two parallel systems for writing
and managing orders without endangering patient safety. Second,
given the recommendations of the IOM, NQF, Leapfrog group,
and most recently the Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology (ONCHIT 2010), CPOE is now
the default expectation and required as part of the minimal use
criteria. So there’s not going to be another controlled trial of CPOE
use, which is too bad because I think a lot can be learned by what
happens when you put these systems in place. In our CPOE study,
some of the residents, faculty, and medical student teams in our
hospital used paper orders and some used a home-grown CPOE
system called The Medical Gopher (McDonald and Tierney 1986a)
to write orders for more than 5,000 hospital patients over a twoyear period. All tasks in this system were menu driven. Menus
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were problem and task-specific, so if a patient had heart failure
a majority of the drugs, tests, and nursing orders were specific to
heart failure. Eighty-five percent of the orders were selected from
menus, attesting to the quality of the menus.
Half of the orders were written away from the patient’s ward. In
cases where you don’t have CPOE, if you want to write an order on
a patient who’s on a different floor, you either have to physically
go there, spend precious time trying to locate the chart, and write
the order down, or you have to telephone the ward nurse and give
a verbal order which you hope will be written down and carried
out correctly, all of which increases the chance of errors. However,
with CPOE you could write orders anywhere in the hospital, even
outside of the hospital, for somebody inside the hospital. The
orders were then automatically sent not only to the ward, but to
other places such as the pharmacy and the lab. The orders were
legible, contained dates and times they were written, and were
signed electronically. Physicians could search a patient’s electronic
record, including numeric and coded data along with text reports,
while writing an order.
The system displayed and printed EKGs and their interpretations.
It linked to our inquiry program to get data from prior tests,
treatments, dictated reports, and so on from outside practices and
institutions, when available. This was the beginning of the Indiana
Network for Patient Care back in the late 1980s. Users also had
access to patients’ advance directives, the American Hospital
Formulary Service (ASHP) manual, selected electronic medical
journals, and to the National Library of Medicine’s PubMed.
We found that during this two-year period there was a 13%, or
$900 per admission, reduction in charges among CPOE users.
Length of stay dropped by almost a full day. There was a twelvefold reduction in the time (from 6 hours to 30 minutes) it took for
a patient to receive the first treatment after being admitted to the
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hospital, and the number of drug-related incident reports were a
third lower among CPOE users. We also performed a time-motion
study where observers followed interns on admitting days when
they were really busy. We found that it took the interns an extra
half-hour a day to write orders by computer, about five minutes per
patient per day. But it also decreased by five minutes to six minutes
per day the time they spent looking for information. After we
finished the study in 1991, the system was mandated hospital-wide
and has been in continuous use ever since to write all inpatient
and outpatient orders in the largest public hospital system in the
country.
Reminders for Preventive Care

We performed another study looking at reminders to physicians
from interactive medical records, which showed that if you
reminded physicians to do appropriate preventive care—occult
blood testing, mammograms, prescribing weight reduction diets,
administering vaccines—they did them almost twice as often
(McDonald et al. 1984). As Francis Bacon said, “Men more
frequently need to be reminded than informed.” The biggest
increases in adherence were to physician-authored guidelines for
preventive care.
Monitoring for Adverse Events

There was a study of corollary or follow-up orders to monitor
initial test results or treatments (Overhage et al. 1997), which I
mentioned before. You order a drug; it’s got to be followed up
with a test. For example, an increase in the dose of heparin (a
blood thinning medicine given intravenously) should be followed
by a test to measure blood clotting time. What if the system gave
you the option to order that test automatically when the drug was
ordered? We found that with reminders about corollary orders
doubled the ordering of the appropriate drug-monitoring tests.
The system made it easy for physicians, in that they didn’t have
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to worry about remembering to order the follow-up tests later. It
is important to note that when this intervention, like others before
it, proved successful, it was broadly implemented as ‘usual care’
throughout our inner-city health care organization.
Evidence-Based Suggestions for Care

Not all studies proved successful, however. In a study involving
about 700 patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
asthma in our outpatient practice, we provided care suggestions
based on local evidence-based practice guidelines (Tierney et
al. 2005). For example, if a patient with asthma that was more
than mild wasn’t on an inhaled corticosteroid, the doctors got
a reminder in the middle of their outpatient CPOE ordering
session. At the same time, the system would write an order for a
beclomethasone oral inhaler; if you hit the return button, the order
was processed, but if you hit any other button, it was not. We did
this for a comprehensive set of guidelines for asthma and COPD.
The suggestions failed miserably. They had no effect on physician
adherence to the guidelines, patient adherence to the target
medications, exacerbation of the disease, costs, quality of life,
or satisfaction with care. Why? Well, physicians felt guidelines
were good for some things: they were a convenient source of
information and a good educational tool. However, they also
felt that the guidelines were too rigid to apply to an individual
patient of theirs. They were concerned that they were enforcing
‘cookbook’ medicine; that is, with the computer telling them
what to do, they no longer had the autonomy that they wanted.
They also worried that the suggestions were simply a means
to decrease costs, rather than being about increasing quality of
care. Interestingly, these were the same physicians and practices
where computer reminders increased preventive care. Apparently,
physicians don’t mind decision aids for preventive care, but they
do mind when they suggest treatments.
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We repeated this same study of computerized treatment guidelines
for two other conditions, heart disease (Tierney et al. 2003) and
hypertension (Murray et al. 2004), and we found the same thing.
Why didn’t they work?
For one thing, we didn’t focus on the right patients. When patients
had mild disease, doctors apparently reasoned that unless the
patient was doing badly, there was no reason to ‘rock the boat.’
Even if the evidence-based guidelines suggested this patient really
ought to be on some other medication because it would prevent
bad events, they didn’t want to change meds if the patient seemed
to be doing okay.
We also got the workflow wrong. Doctors wrote orders at the end
of the visit, after the patient had already left the exam room. So if
they wanted to change something they had to bring their patient
back into the room and talk to them again. It was too hard; it’s
easier to say, “I’ll do it next time.” But during the next visit, they
didn’t remember to discuss changing treatment until reminded
again after the patient was out of the room, so some things just
didn’t get done. We didn’t figure out how to fit this decision aid
into their daily practice of medicine.
And finally, it was just the wrong approach. Perhaps we didn’t
involve the physicians enough in the process. Again, it seemed to
be the computer telling them what to do, rather than their using
the computer as a tool to help them tell themselves what to do. A
better approach might be to present primary care physicians with
a set of rules for which the computer could remind them, with the
physicians having input into the triggers (e.g., the level of elevated
blood pressure or the number of elevated blood pressures that were
necessary before the computer suggested increasing the dose of
that patient’s antihypertensive medication).
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So we tried a different approach in a study involving 720
outpatients with chronic heart failure in two Veterans Affairs
medical centers in Indianapolis and Seattle, Washington, in which
we did engage the physicians (Subramanian et al. 2004). We met
with VA physicians and asked them how the computer system
might improve their care of patients with heart failure. They helped
write the guidelines and how to identify patients who would be
eligible for care suggestions. We then used mailed questionnaires
to assess the patients two weeks before each visit—their functional
class and symptoms and how they did since their last doctor visit.
Then we added a reminder sheet that clipped to the patient’s paper
chart before the doctor got to that patient. If your patient was in
the intervention group, you got information about their current
symptoms and whether they were doing better or worse. The
reminder sheet included symptom information, the date of the
test which had documented the patient’s heart failure, and “care
options at this time” rather than suggested treatments. That is,
instead of writing orders for treatments in the computer, the paper
form contained a list of actions that you might consider doing. The
control group was just given the information that their patient had
heart failure.
Unfortunately, symptom information and care suggestion reminder
sheets had no effect on physicians’ treatment decisions or patient
outcomes, even among those patients who were not doing well,
although the intervention patients were significantly more satisfied
with their physicians and the care they received. We think the
reminder sheets engendered discussion between the doctors and
the patients because they presented information about symptoms
of those patients. However, they didn’t result in more intensive
heart failure treatment and may actually have harmed the patients:
there were more than double the number of hospitalizations at
six months and at twelve months among the intervention group,
although this could have been because intervention doctors were
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paying more attention to symptoms and hospitalizing patients who
needed it who would not otherwise have been hospitalized.
Reminders to Discuss Advance Directives with At Risk Patients

Not all our studies had negative outcomes. In a study of reminders
to discuss end-of-life care, we enrolled 1,000 patients who were at
risk of needing such discussions because of their age (>75 years)
or because they had serious medical conditions such as heart, lung,
liver, or kidney disease, cancer, or stroke (Dexter et al. 1998).
The computer suggested that doctors talk to their patients about
advance directives, using either what we call instruction directives
(“Do you want to have a ventilator; artificial nutrition; surgery,
if it’s indicated medically but you’re in a situation where you’re
terminally ill and not likely to get better?”) or proxy directives
(“Who do you want speaking for you? Who do you want to be your
health care representative?”) Physicians got either reminders to
talk about advance directives, reminders to talk about proxies, both
or neither.
After every visit the patients were asked, “Did your doctor talk
to you about end-of-life care?” and how satisfied they were with
their doctor and the visit just completed. Among patients whose
physicians did not receive reminders, doctors talked to them
about advance directives only 2% of the time, a little more often
if they got reminders for proxy directives, and a little bit more for
instruction directives. When physicians received both reminders,
more than 20% of them talked to their patients, and two-thirds
of the time that they talked to their patients an advance directive
form was filled out. In this case, a simple computer reminder
increased the likelihood of doctors talking to their patients about
the prickly issue of end-of-life care. Importantly, even though a lot
of times doctors are kind of uncomfortable broaching the subject,
patients preferred that their doctor talked with them about advance
directives and end-of-life care in the primary care clinic rather than

27

Lourie Memorial Lecture on Health Policy
in the ICU and were more satisfied with their doctors and primary
care when such discussions occurred.
Enhancing Communication between Providers

We’ve performed studies in other settings besides hospitals and
doctors’ offices. In one study, we assessed the effectiveness of a
pharmacy-based care program for patients with asthma or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease who went to one of 36 community
drugstores to refill their prescriptions (Weinberger et al. 2002). The
pharmacists received patient-specific data from patients’ electronic
health records on peak expiratory flow rates, past use of breathing
medications, and recent ER visits for breathing problems. They
were also given customized patient educational materials and
resources that were to be used by the pharmacists to inform those
patients whose were not doing well. In one control group, patients
received peak flow meters, instructions in how to use them, and
monthly tracking of meter readings, but this information was not
provided to their pharmacists. In the second (usual care) control
group, patients interviewed monthly to see how they were doing,
but they received no meters and their pharmacists received no
information about them. Pharmacists in both control groups had
a training session informing them about asthma and guidelines
for self-care but received no patient data or educational materials.
At the end of the study, patients who received the intervention
from their pharmacists seemed to have better lung function, and
they were more satisfied with their care. However, there was no
difference in their adherence to care guidelines, and they were
twice as likely to be hospitalized. So, as in the earlier study, the
information provided to the pharmacists may have caused harm to
the patients, or alternatively, it may have sensitized pharmacists to
patients who were ill and needed more intensive treatments.
Evidence about the benefits of enhanced patient communication
is still up in the air. It’s still not clear what effect electronic health
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records are going to have because we’re still working on the
process of managing the system.

Unintended Consequences of CPOE
In October 2002 the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, a tertiarycare level facility with many infants transported from other
hospitals into their ICU, implemented a CPOE system in response
to the IOM’s (1999) landmark report and the Leapfrog Group’s
(2000) promotion of this technology, which we had studied a
decade earlier and had been using hospital-wide ever since.
Eighteen months later, researchers found that, as expected, “CPOE
implementation...resulted in significant reductions in harmful
adverse drug events (ADEs)” (Han et al. 2005). However, they also
found that the hospital also experienced an unexpected increase in
mortality from 2.8% before CPOE implementation to 6.6% after
implementation. They ruled out demographic or clinical factors
and then focused on changes in the usual “chain of events” when
a critically sick infant was being admitted to the ICU after CPOE
implementation. They found that the medical team’s response
time was slower, some doctors and nurses were being pulled away
from the patient’s bedside to operate computer terminals, and
critical face-to-face interactions between physicians and nurses had
declined. These things happened because the CPOE system was
hard to use and occasionally overburdened, suffering processing
delays. Sometimes the information didn’t go to the right person so
there were delays in getting things done, which in a newborn ICU
can make the difference between life and death.
From this we learned that technologies are tools for improving
the health care system, but they’re not standalone fixes. You can’t
just throw medical records and clinical decision support tools
into health care settings and expect something good to happen.
Information technology has to be part of a careful and complete
re-engineering of the health care system that learns how to
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function efficiently and effectively and use electronic information.
Sometimes there’s too much reliance on technology and ‘geeks’
and not enough on clinical acumen and common sense. The best
use of health information technology incorporates all of these into
enhanced systems that are more efficient and safer, but this takes
diligence on the part of those implementing such systems.

CPOE Can Lower the Cost of Health Care
In the early 1980s, we looked at our local data and found that many
outpatient tests were often repeated for no obvious reason, so in
1987 we studied whether using our outpatient CPOE system to
display previous diagnostic test results would lower the ordering
of subsequent diagnostic tests (Tierney et al. 1987). Half of each
physician’s patients were randomized as control patients and
half were randomized so that when physicians ordered one of the
eight most commonly ordered diagnostic tests in our practice,
the CPOE system displayed the most recent previous results for
that test. Compared to the pre-study period, when physicians
saw their patients’ previous test results, they ordered 17% fewer
tests compared to a drop of 11% when the past results were not
displayed. As a result of fewer tests, the costs associated with those
patients’ care also dropped significantly. Unfortunately, as soon as
the previous test result display was discontinued, test orders began
to return to their previous levels. This told us that we weren’t
just educating physicians about the number of tests they were
ordering—they also needed the constant display of past results.
Ever since, we show the most recent result (and its date) whenever
any outpatient diagnostic test is ordered.
We performed a similar study in which we developed statistical
equations to predict the probability of an abnormality being
detected as a result of eight commonly ordered diagnostic
tests (Tierney et al. 1988). We divided the subject patients into
intervention and control groups, and whenever the physician
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ordered one of the tests for a patient in the intervention group using
the outpatient CPOE system, the computer displayed the likelihood
that the test would show the abnormality that the physician had
selected as the main one of interest. “For example, if the physician
ordered a serum electrolyte panel and listed hyperkalemia as the
abnormality of concern, the computer presented the probability of
hyperkalemia” (p. 1196). After viewing the computer’s prediction,
the physician could choose to cancel the test or continue to order
it. Physicians did not see probabilities for their control patients.
Among the 112 physicians and more than 9,000 patients involved
in this study, there was a significant, although small, reduction
in testing when they got the probability information, but it was
mainly among tests with a low risk of abnormal results. This was
the first study showing that physicians would respond to specific
numeric probability predictions. Once again, after the intervention
was discontinued test ordering returned to the pre-study levels.
Finally, our simplest intervention was when the computer display
just said “This is what the test you just ordered costs, and here’s
the total cost of all of the tests you’ve ordered today” (Tierney et
al. 1990). When we did that, there was a 13 percent reduction in
test ordering. But once again, “the effects of this intervention did
not persist after it was discontinued” (p. 1499).
Given the potential financial benefits (and significant costs!) of
EHRs, do they ultimately cost money or save money? Samuel
Wang and colleagues in the Harvard group conducted a costbenefit study to analyze the financial effects of EHRs on health
care organizations, using data from their own institution and a
previously published literature review (Wang et al. 2003). They
concluded that over a 5-year period, the average net benefit
was $86,400 per provider, “primarily from savings in drug
expenditures, improved utilization of radiology tests, better capture
of charges, and decreased billing errors” (2003, 397). However,
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they noted that “The magnitude of the return is sensitive to several
key factors” (2003, 397). They were being optimistic.
The RAND group reviewed all of the studies that looked at the
cost of implementing health information technology (HIT) using
data from a large survey of health care facilities’ adoption of and
plans to adopt HIT (Hillestad et al. 2005). They included in the
adoption category organizations that had contracted for but had not
yet installed an EMR system, and they surveyed the literature for
evidence of the effects of HIT. They noted that,
In general, the currently useful evidence is not
robust enough to make strong predictions, and we
describe our results only as ‘potential’...[that is,]
‘assuming that interconnected and interoperable
EMR systems are adopted widely and used
effectively.’ (p. 1104)
They concluded,
[E]ffective EMR implementation and networking
could eventually save more than $81 billion
annually—by improving health care efficiency
and safety—and that HIT-enabled prevention and
management of chronic disease could eventually
double those savings while increasing health and
other social benefits. However, this is unlikely to be
realized without related changes to the health care
system. (p. 1103)
Maybe Electronic Health Records save money, maybe they don’t.
But I’m going to argue that’s not why we’re installing them. We’re
putting them in because we have to communicate. Using EHRs
is the only way to do so in the 21st century with its increasingly
complex and disconnected health care.
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Looking to the Future
So where’s the edge of the water? The high speed Internet is
going to increase our capability of communicating through EHRs.
We’re going to be able to show real x-ray images, displaying the
same dense images anywhere in the country as in the hospital
that generated them. So we can actually have people reading your
x-rays who don’t have to sit in your hospital. This could be good
(i.e., having world-class specialists reading x-rays) or bad (i.e.,
physicians not having a local radiologist to discuss the x-ray with).
HIT is a two-edged sword.
There will be better provider-computer interfaces, better
graphic design, touch screen technology, portable devices, voice
recognition, etc.: this is all coming. Much of it is already here.
The radiologists in my hospital use a voice recognition system
to dictate x-ray reports. And we get the results in the patient’s
electronic record less than an hour after an x-ray is taken. Better
devices, wireless technology, small tablet computers, and better
health information technology will all improve how we practice
medicine.
Everybody uses the Internet browser, right? How many of you ever
took a course in how to use it? Why not? Because it’s obvious how
to use it. Well, our health-related technology needs to be obvious
too. You shouldn’t need a manual. You shouldn’t need instructions.
You should be able to sit down, log in, and know right off the bat
how to use it. It ought to be obvious, and it’s getting to be that way.
There will also be lots of new options for devices and platforms. If
I’m working in the emergency department, I need to be mobile. If
I’m working in radiology, I don’t want to be mobile. So let’s have
different options that fit people’s workflow.
We need better actionable care guidelines. What needs to be done
better? What data do we need to capture to do it better? And how
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do we get that information to the right people at the right time?
How do better prepare clinicians, facilities, computer information
officers, etc., to take full advantage of electronic media and not
be hamstrung by it? We all have to be willing to accept these
changes in our work environment. We have to expect to have
the right information at the right time and be willing and able to
work together to make all this happen. In this new era of health
information technology, some will consider it to be heaven while
others will think it’s hell. But like it or not, the dawn of a new era
is here. Some of us have been in this era since the 1970s; the rest
of US health care is entering this world now, too. I don’t know
where it’s going to take us, but it’s going to be an interesting ride. I
can’t predict how it’s going to go, and it’s been painful for a lot of
people. But in my mind, the benefits will ultimately be worth the
costs.
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